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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KAREN ANDERSON FAHEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
WILBUR

J.

No. 8373

C. FAHEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by District
Judge Joseph G. Jeppson awarding a divorce to plaintiff
against the defendant. Plaintiff was awarded custody of the
minor children of the parties and was also awarded the use
of the home belonging to the plaintiff and defendant, the furniture and fixtures therein and the automobile owned by the
parties. The defendant resisted both the granting of the divorce and the disposition of the property.
STATEMENT OF FACT
It is difficult to make a concise yet fair statement of the
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facts in this case because of the sharp conflict between the
inferences and innuendos made by the plaintiff in her direct
testimony and the admissions which she made on cross-examination. The testimony of the defendant is also at variance
with the direct testimony of the plaintiff. However, because on
appeal it is necessary for the Court to draw inferences from
the evidence most favorable to the party prevailing below,
counsel for the appellant will in this Statement of Fact, attempt
to restrict the statement to the facts that can be gleaned from
the testimony of the plaintiff on both direct and cross examination. However, only from a reading of the complete transcript in the case is it possible to gain an accurate picture of
the circumstances under which this marriage began, existed
and ended.
In November of 1947 the plaintiff, then an unmarried
woman, went on a Mission for the Latter-day Saints Church
to the Hawaiian Islands (27). While there she experienced
considerable difficulty in getting along with her associates, particular! y the Mission President, E. Wesley Smith ( 34) .
The defendant, who was at the time not a member of the
L.D.S. Church, was employed in the Hawaiian Islands as a
radio technician (73). He was at the time a widower, his
first wife having died in 1946, leaving a child, Susan, who
in 1947 was approximately 6 years of age (74). The defendant became interested in the L.D.S. Church and at the
meetings held by the missionaries in the Hawaiian Islands
which he attended, became acquainted with the plaintiff. Sometime later at a ceremony attended by the plaintiff, the defendant was baptized a member of the church (33).
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The two became interested in one another and carried
on a courtship mostly by letter ( 35). It appears that at no
time during this courtship did they overstep the bounds of
propriety in view of the ecclesiastical position of the plaintiff
at the time. The two were married in the Hawaiian Islands
on October 9, 1948, (2) the plaintiff having been granted
a release from her Mission immediately before the marriage
ceremony ( 34) .
The plaintiff testified that she never did love the defendant ( 34) but was forced into the marriage by the Mission
president because he was irritated with her and wished to be
rid of her as a missionary. She further testified that not having
loved the defendant, she then proceeded to hate him from
the day of the marriage on because of the fact that physical
relationship with him was distasteful. Her testimony in this
regard is as follows ( 37) :
"From the first day after I married him, the way
he physically and sexually treated me I hated him from
that day on until this day."
A short time before the marriage, the defendant had
brought his daughter by his former marriage to the Hawaiia~
Islands ( 35). She had previously been residing with his mother
in the United States. The couple lived on the Islands with
the child Susan until April of 1949 when the defendant's contract with Radio Corporation of America terminated, when
they moved to Salt Lake City, where they made their home (73).
For a short time they resided with the plaintiff's grandmother, but after some two months located and moved into an
apartment of their own (75). The defendant at first had some

5
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difficulty finding lucrative employment in Salt Lake City.
In the Islands he had been earning approximately $600.00 per
month. The first job which he secured. in Salt Lake City paid
him only one-third of that amount (75). As a result he secured
an additional job and worked a total of approximately 18 hours
a day for a period of time (75-51). The plaintiff also secured employment, which she retained up until the time their
baby was born in 1954 (76). The defendant later secured a
better job working as a full time employee of the Utah State
National Guard (75) and the couple purchased themselves
a home in Salt Lake City (76).
At the beginning of the Korean War, the defendant was
inducted into active service with the balance of the Utah National Guard (76). He was first sent to a station in the State
of Kansas where, after a period of some months, the plaintiff
and the child Susan joined him (76). The plaintiff found employment in Kansas and stayed there on the job which she
had after the defendant was sent overseas ( 77) .
After the defendant's discharge from the service, both
the plaintiff and the defendant and the child Susan returned
to Salt Lake City where they moved into the home which they
formerly purchased and which had been rented while they
were away (77). They continued to reside in this home until
a child was born to them on July 17, 1954. Within three weeks
after the child was born, plaintiff left the defendant ( 83) and
shortly thereafter instituted proceedings for divorce.
During all the period of their married life the plaintiff
handled the finances of both of the parties, she keeping her
own earnings and he turning over to her his paycheck ( 36).

6
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

---------~------------

She would then pay the bills and would return to the defendant
enough for him to pay his tithing and for his incidental spending money. She complained bitterly about the amount of money
spent by the defendant. She complained because he spent
money on his hobby, which was radio, in an amount varying
between $5.00 and $2 5.00 per month (53). She complained
because he spent $220.00 over a period of some one and onehalf years for flying lessons (52), which the defendant testified
he regarded as desirable to improve his standing in his profession (79). She complained because on occasion the defendant bought lunch for male friends ( 5~~), although the defendant testified that these occasions were so few that he was embarrassed in light of like favors which he received from his
associates at work ( 79). Plaintiff belittled the defendant because during the period prior to their marriage while he was
working in Hawaii he had saved no money from his earnings
(50). vet the evidence shows that while the defendant was
overseas, the plaintiff, while receiving her own earnings,
$140.00 a month allowance from the defendant's pay and
$80.00 per month rental from their Salt Lake house, saved
nothing at all and in fact partialfy dissipated a bank account
of $500.00, which the defendant had established by borrowing
shortly before he went overseas and had paid back, not out of
the allotment to the plaintiff, but out of the small amount
retained from his earnings (78) (Ex. 7).
Plaintiff further complained that on two occasions, one
in 1949 and one in 1950, the defendant struck her ( 30). However, she admitted that no such thing had occurred in the last
four years of their married life together ( 31) . In regard to the

7
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striking incidents, the defendant recalled one of them, but
could not recall the other. In regard to the one he did recall,
he described the circumstances under which it had occurred and
the provocation therefor, and further testified that he was immediately sorry and ashamed of what he had done, and the
couple made up their differences the next day ( 85-86).
Plaintiff further complained that the defendant at times,
when his temper was aroused, would shout at her and the child
Susan. Her principal complaint against him throughout, however, appears to have been that he would engage in sexual
intercourse with her at times when she did not desire such
association, and also that she felt he was unduly severe in
his discipline of the child Susan, who subsequent to the marriage
had been adopted by the plaintiff.
In the year 195 3 ( 65) the plaintiff's mother, who had previously been residing in the State of Washington, returned
to Salt Lake City to live. Her association with the couple appears to have been very close and from that time on the marriage disintegrated rapidly (81-82).
For a number of years after the marriage plaintiff had
been unable to have children which she testified she wanted
very badly ( 40). Although she claims that at the time she was
constantly and consistently hating her husband, she submitted
to a major operation and other less severe but rather extensive
and painful treatments in an effort to establish her fertility
( 41-42). She finally became pregnant and had a child on
July 17, 1954. Shortly after the child was born, plaintiff went
to her grandmother's house to stay for a short period and the
plaintiff's mother came down to keep house for the defendant
8
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and the child Susan ( 62) . One night while this arrangement
was in progress, the defendant chastised Susan for disobeying
him. The facts surrounding this incident are confused and the
evidence conflicting, Mrs. Fahey's mother testifying that the
defendant was unduly severe and slapped the child in the face
leaving welts on her face ( 64). The defendant, on the other
hand, described the incident as being a necessary chastisement
for a child who, because of the unstable family life which she
had experienced, was rebellious and in fact bordering on delinquency (84-85). At any rate the plaintiff's mother the next
day reported the incident to the plaintiff, who was staying
at her grandmother's house. The plaintiff thereupon filed suit
for divorce and obtained a restraining order alleging that
she feared that the defendant would do great bodily harm
to herself, to the child Susan and to the baby. Notwithstanding
this allegation two days later when she wanted to do some shopping and to be relieved of the care of the baby, she voluntarily
left him alone with the defendant for a full afternoon ( 46).
Further facts will be hereinafter discussed in connection
with the points to which they are applicable.
STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBITS 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 AND 15.
POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT THE PLAINTIFF
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WAS CONFINED IN A SANITARIUM A SHORT TIME
BEFORE THEIR MARRIAGE.
POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE
DEFENDANT TO CALL DRS. HORNE AND KIRK TO
TESTIFY REGARDING THE MENTAL ILLNESS OF THE
PLAINTIFF, AND PRESIDENT E. WESLEY SMITH TO
TESTIFY REGARDING THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARRIAGE OF THE PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIVORCE
TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE REASON THAT THERE
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A
FINDING OF CRUELTY.
POINT FIVE
THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ORDERED BY THE
COURT IS INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN REJECTING DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBITS 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 AND 15.
The plaintiff testified that the marriage was entered into
by her reluctantly largely because of the pressuring of the
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defendant and of President E. Wesley Smith of the Hawaiian
Islands ( 34) . This matter is important because the court in
comments made at the time the decision was rendered stated
that the plaintiff was to some extent excused from her admittedly improper conduct during the marriage by the fact
that the marriage got off to a bad start from the fact that there
had been no normal courtship preceding it ( 98-99). The
defendant's testimony was to the contrary to the effect that
while the courtship was necessarily restrained because of the
plaintiff's ecclesiastical position, there was definitely love and
affection between the parties and the marriage was one which
was as much or more of the plaintiff's making than anyone
else (80).
The defendant offered in evidence eleven letters written
by the plaintiff to the defendant in the months immediately
precedmg their marriage. These letters express in the most
endearing terms the plaintiff's love for the defendant and her
desire to become his wife. A reading of them could not help
convince an impartial observer that the plaintiff's testimony
as to the circumstances under which the marriage was entered
into was absolutely false. The Court refused to accept these
letters in evidence, stating at the time that it was immaterial
to the case under what circumstances the marriage was entered
into and that in any event the plaintiff's story as to the circumstances did not inure to her benefit. This is certainly inconsistent
with the later statements of the court to the effect that the
plainiff was, to some extent, excused from her breach of the
marriage covenant by the fact that she had not entered into
it under normal circumstances.
11
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POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
THE DEFENDANT TO PROVE THAT THE PLAINTIFF
WAS CONFINED IN A SANITARIUM A SHORT TIME
BEFORE THEIR MARRIAGE.
The defendant offered to prove that after being sent on
her l\1ission to Hawaii and within the year preceding the marriage, the plaintiff had quarreled violently with her missionary
companions and as a result of one quarrel had become so
emotionally upset that she was for a period of time confined
to a mental sanitarium for mental treatment ( 28). This offer
of proof was rejected by the Court. Such evidence appears clearly to have been competent. The Court made the statement at
the time he announced his findings that the emotional stability
of the wronged party would be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not the actions of the other party
were sufficient to constitute cruelty. Certainly if this is true,
then the corollary would be true that the amount of provocation
and the problem with which the defendant had to deal should
have been taken into consideration in determining whether or
not the actions of the defendant were such as to warrant
censor or blame on his part. While a husband should undoubtedly make certain allowances for any mental illness on
the part of his wife and attempt to adjust himself to them,
it is also true that a husband dealing with an emotionally unstable wife is presented with problems that a husband with
a normal wifes does not have and he may have to do things
in order to keep the marriage riding smoothly which would
not be necessary where the wife is well adjusted mentally
and emotionally. Rejection of this evidence was clear error.
12
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POINT THREE
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE
DEFENDANT TO CALL DRS. HORNE AND KIRK TO
TESTIFY REGARDING THE MENTAL ILLNESS OF THE
PLAINTIFF, AND PRESIDENT E. WESLEY SMITH TO
TESTIFY REGARDING THE . CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE MARRIAGE OF THE PLAINTIFF AND
DEFENDANT.
The trial of the case moved more swiftly than counsel
for the defendant had anticipated as there was no cross-examination at all of the defendant. Defendant had made arrangements for two physicians to appear later in the afternoon to
give testimony. When they were not there at the close of the
examination of the defendant, defendant's counsel requested a short recess in order to get them there ( 89) . The
Court denied this continuance, not on the ground that time
was a factor because it was then only midafternoon and the
Court had no other matters scheduled for that day, but on
the ground that the testimony of the doctors would be immaterial ( 92).
As was shown in the statement which constituted an offer
of proof as to what the doctors would testify, the defendant
would have shown by these doctors that the plaintiff had twice
attempted suicide. Once while plaintiff and defendant were
residing together and the second time after the defendant had
left for army duty and the plaintiff had not even seen him
for a period of two months. The plaintiff on cross-examination
had admitted certain facts surrounding the two instances to

13
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which the doctors would have testified, but denied that there
was any suicidal intent at either time. The doctors would have
testified that the intention to commit suicide had been expressed to them by the defendant. The court held that this
was immaterial. It is the position of the defendant that this
testimony was highly material as set forth in the argument
under the preceding point.
Defendant was also prepared to call President E. Wesley
Smith of the Hawaiian Islands for the purpose of refuting
the testimony of the plaintiff regarding the circumstances under
which the marriage had taken place. The defendant felt and
still feels that this testimony was relevant and for the reasons
set forth in the argument under Point One. The Court, however, held that President Smith's testimony would be of no
value and refused to allow the defendant to call him. These
actions on the part of the Court constituted obvious error
to the prejudice of the defendant.
POINT FOUR
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIVORCE
TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE REASON THAT THERE
WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO WARRANT A
FINDING OF CRUELTY.
This case presents for determination three questions:
(a) Is incompatibility grounds for a divorce in the
State of Utah?
(b) Can a person secure a divorce merely because he
no longer loves his spouse and wishes to be divorced?
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(c) May a person by their own misconduct deliberately
goad the other party to a marriage to excesses of
language or conduct and then assign such excesses
as cause for divorce?
The Trial Court is of the opinion that this Court by
judicial legislation has made incompatibility grounds for
divorce in this state, and stated so clearly during discussion
with counsel at the time the Court was announcing its decision
(93). The Court went on to say, "I was surprised at that
case" (96). The Court nevertheless proceeded to grant the
divorce merely because plaintiff wanted it and testified that
she did not love the aefendant, could not get along with him
and desired to be divorced. Although the Trial Court did not
identify by name the case on which reliance was placed, reference was evidently made to the case of Hendricks v. Hendricks,
____ Ut. ____ , 257, Pac. (2d) 366. Counsel does not understand
that this Court in the Hendricks case decided any such thing
as Judge Jeppson apparently felt was decided. The Court did
not in the Hendricks case decide that incompatibility was
grounds for divorce, but rather held that recrimination is not
necessarily a defense to a divorce action. In the Hendricks
case, both parties were seeking the divorce, neither one wanted
to continue the marriage relationship, both of them wanted
to rid themselves of the rights and obligations which had been
acquired by the marriage ceremony. Both of them were guilty
of conduct against the other which would constitute, under
the statutes of the State of Utah, grounds for divorce. The only
question there involved was whether or not when grounds for
divorce exist on each side where both parties wanted a divorce,
the Court itself should determine as a matter of public policy

15
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that it should grant no divorce at all. The Court determined
that it would not refuse to grant a divorce under such circumstances, that where grounds for divorce existed public policy
did not require two people to live together where both of
them were struggling to rid themselves of the marriage. In
this case we have no such situation. In this case we have the
party guilty of the greater wrong, the party guilty of the grounds
for divorce, if there were any, attempting to secure a divorce
from the wronged party, who, in spite of the situation that
prevailed desired to effect a reconciliation and continue the
marriage relationship. To permit a divorce under such circumstances would be to make a sham of the marriage contract
and to permit a person to be relieved thereof because of her
own wrong and not because of the wrong of the other party.
The Trial Court recognized, as would have to be recognized by any impartial observer, that whatever intemperence
of speech or conduct defendant might have exhibited, resulted
directly from the abuses which he had accepted from the plaintiff. The Court stated (97-98):
"Now if you get a neurotic person, it is almost impossible to live harmoniously with them. * * * Now
because it is hard, the person is driven to conduct
which would justify a divorce. They do not realize that
the neurotic condition is the basis, and they don't have
the sympathy. It is pretty hard to do it. We cannot
always administer what these doctors call a therapy
that would help a nervous person. They get irritated
instead. I would and you would, we all do."
He went on to say on page 106:
"There are things the plaintiff ought to consider in
this case, and that is, that where you are overly sen16
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sthve and nervous, it makes it very difficult for the
persons around you to get along, where they are not
skilled in that :field, and they just have to talk the way
they feel."
He further stated on page 105 of the record:
"In the ordinary families the amount of cruelty
they had in this case, should and could be overruled."
(the word "overruled" appears to be a typographical error
and should read "overlooked.")
In determining where the fault lay, the Court said (Tr. 96):
"The Court does not say it is all on one side, it
might be just about even."
The statement of the Court that the fault is just about even
does not appear to be borne out by the evidence, even taken
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It is true that she
testified that the defendant had struck her on two occasions,
but after that she continued to live with him as his wife for
some four years without a repetition of the offense and certainly those actions, even though the evidence discloses considerable provocation therefor, were completely condoned. If
we are to believe, at face value, the testimony of the plaintiff as
given in this case, the situation is this: We have a woman
who did not ·want a husband, but who wanted a family. She
became acquainted with a widower, who already had a child
that she desired to have as her own. Then, although she did
not love the man she married him. Sexual relationship was
distasteful to her. After the first sex act, her indifference turned
to hate. Notwithstanding that she went along with the sham
of the marriage until she had adopted the child. Then, not
satisfied with that, desiring to be a natural mother, she con17
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tinued to live in a marriage relationship with a man she hated,
undergoing extensive medical and surgical treatment to make
herself fertile. She continued with this sham until she conceived and bore a child. Then, having what she had wanted
in the first place from the marriage relationship, she seeks to
cast aside the man who made it possible, cutting him off from
normal relationship, not only with his wife, whom he testified
he still loved in spite of what had happened, but also from
his natural children whom as a father he naturally loved.
It is the position of the defendant that this is not a true
picture of what gave rise to the difficulties in this marriage.
The evidence is unmistakable that the plaintiff is a highly
neurotic woman and that the defendant had a great deal to
put up with. It may well be that the mental condition of the
plaintiff caused Mr. Fahey considerable aggravation at times;
however, the evidence in the record, as well as the exhibits
that were offered and refused, establish that Mrs. Fahey did
love her husband at the time she married him and did continue
to love him until the time that her mother came down to live
near the couple. Exhibit 4, which was received in evidence, is
a letter written some five years after the marriage in which she
still expressed her love for her husband, and Exhibit 5 was
written only about one year before the divorce action. The
rather subtle hand of the plaintiff's mother is plainly evident
in the disruption of this marriage. It was not until she came
to Salt Lake that the trouble became really serious. It was
she who carried the details of the alleged abuse of Susan which
allegedly lead to the final break, and it was she who thwarted
all attempts at reconciliation.
18
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The defendant appealed to the authorities of the Church
to which they both belonged in an effort to bring about a
reconciliation. Exhibit 16, which was offered but rejected, is
evidence of these attempts. At his instigation, Pres. Joseph
Fielding Smith called a meeting between the parties. However,
when the plaintiff appeared, rather than appearing alone, she
appeared with her mother, who proceeded to scuttle all attempts
at reconciliation. The mother testified that she went to this
meeting at the request of her daughter (70). The plaintiff,
on the other hand, previously testified, while the mother was
excluded from the court room, that she did not request her
mother to go, but that it was her mother's own idea to go
along ( 160).
This is not an irreconcilable cleft; it is one which would
be readily reconciled if this divorce were denied and the parties
left to their own devices rather than subject to the pressure
of an overly-possessive mother of one of the parties. Certainly
public policy does not require the granting of a divorce on
sham or even on very slim grounds in a situation such as this.
The public policy in this regard was very well set forth
by this Court in Cordner v. Cordner, 94 Ut. 466, 61 Pac. (2d)
601, in the following words:
"The marriage covenant creates a status not lightly
to be regarded. It is presumed that before a man and
a woman marry they have wisely, carefully, discreetly,
and reverently considered the matter. The institution
of marriage is a sacred one protected by the law, fostered by religion, and maintained and encouraged by
organized society. Once entered into, good cause for
separation must be alleged and proved before the covenant may be set aside."
19
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In the case of Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Ut. 580; 245 Pac.
335, the Court set aside a Decree of Divorce holding: "We
think the evidence of the wife's conduct in this case fails to
establish legal cruelty." The Court then went on to quote
from the case of Doe v. Doe, 158 Pac. 781, 48 Ut. 200, to the
effect that the courts would grant a divorce for cruelty to a
wife in much less aggravated cases than would be required
to grant a husband a divorce from the wife. This perhaps is
sound policy although the reasoning behind it has been somewhat tempered since that time by the emancipated social
status of women. However, even so, this Court or any other
Court having cruelty as grounds for divorce has never gone
so far as to say that a wife may secure a divorce under circumstances where her husband's conduct is nothing more than
the normal and natural conduct of the man to misconduct on
the part of the wife.
In the case of Lundgreen v. Lundgreen, 184 Pac. (2d)
670, the husband sought a divorce from his wife on the
grounds of constant quarreling and bickering. The Court did
sustain the Decree awarded to the husband in that case, but
stated:

"If these parties were younger, we might hesitate
to sustain the decree. However, in this case both parties are over 70. They are rapidly approaching the time
when they will be solely dependent physically as well
as financially. Acts and remarks which would usually
not irritate people much younger, have annoyed these
people because of ill-health and difficulties in hearing.
Their inability to adjust, their lack of cooperation, their
old-age and utter financial dependency, have tended
to magnify the irritation over the conduct of each
other."
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Here we have no such situation. Here we have a couple
in their thirties, still bearing children. The couple was getting
along well financially. As the trial judge pointed out, such
conduct as is here at issue should be overlooked. The defendant since the couple separated has shown every desire
to reconcile. He has made efforts which without doubt, if not
interferred with by the mother-in-law, would have been successful. Good public policy demands that the Court here recognize the sanctity of the marriage contract by refusing a
divorce and by leaving the couple to work out their problems
in a more natural way. Under the circumstances, if the Decree
were affirmed the defendant would be punished for something
that was not his fault. The Court would, thereby, be furthering the designs and schemes of an overly possessive woman,
who, having lost her husband and having only recently married a man much older, attempts to grasp at her daughter and
her daughter's family by systematically brain-washing them
against their husband and father.
POINT FIVE
THE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ORDERED BY THE
COURT IS INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST.
The Court in effect awarded to the plaintiff in this case
all of the property which the plaintiff and defendant had acquired over the years of their married life. The defendant
did not at the trial and does not now complain about the
amount of support money. So long as the children are living
with the mother alone and dependant upon her for support,
he feels that the amount is fair and reasonable as he wants the
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children well taken care of. However, he does complain of
the fact that he salvaged nothing out of the marriage. The
automobile was awarded to the plaintiff; all of the furniture
in the home, with the exception of a small equity in a deepfreeze, was awarded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was awarded
the right to live in the home in which the couple had approximately a $5000.00 equity. It is true that the Court stated that
if the property were ever sold the defendant should receive
one-half of the equity realized, provided, however, that the
plaintiff should first be paid back all payments which she made
on the property including interest, and interest on the interest.
It is evident, therefore, that any award to the defendant in
that case is an illusory as his equity would be entirely consumed
in a period of two or three years by this provision.
As the matter stands, he is left without a home, without
property, without a wife and with his children being weaned
away from him by a mother-in-law who has already succeeded
in wrecking his marriage. Certainly a Court of equity cannot
sanction this situation.
Respectfully submitted,
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
721 Continental Bank Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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